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On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games
Bram Driesen∗ Andre´s Perea∗ Hans Peters∗
August 2007
Abstract
In this paper we study three different types of loss aversion equi-
libria in bimatrix games. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria
of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points
– points below which they consider payoffs to be losses – are endoge-
nous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point
loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000) under the name
of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium’. There, the players’ reference
points depend on the beliefs about their opponents’ strategies. The
second type, the maximin loss aversion equilibrium, differs from the
fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in that the reference point is now
only based on the carrier of the players’ beliefs, not on the exact prob-
abilities. In the third, the safety level loss aversion equilibrium, this
dependence is completely dispensed with. Finally, we do a compara-
tive statics analysis of all three equilibrium concepts in 2× 2 bimatrix
games. The results indicate that a player, under some conditions,
benefits from his opponent falsely believing he is loss averse.
1 Introduction
Ever since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed expected utility
theory, it has been the dominant approach in individual decision-making
∗Department of Quantitative Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. Telephone: +31-43-3883835. Telefax: +31-
43-3884874. Email adresses: B.Driesen@ke.unimaas.nl, A.Perea@ke.unimaas.nl,
H.Peters@ke.unimaas.nl.
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under uncertainty. In spite of the succes expected utility theory has had in
the past, its pervasive role in economic theory has also been subject to a
lot of criticism. One of the earliest and most famous examples of this is the
Allais paradox (Allais, 1953)1.
Several alternative models for decision-making under uncertainty have
been proposed in the literature. One of the most successful non-expected
utility theories is named ‘prospect theory’, and was developed in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). This theory assumes that economic agents make choices
between lotteries in two phases: an editing phase and an evaluation phase.
In the editing phase, agents observe and interpret the options between which
they must choose using several simple heuristics, one of which is the framing
of payoffs as gains or as losses, using a reference point. In the evaluation
phase, an agent modifies his utility function to a reference-dependent utility
function, to account for the perception of the payoffs. That is, perceived
losses are weighted downwards, a phenomenon frequently referred to as loss
aversion. The agent then transforms the probabilities with which payoffs
are realized using a probability weighting function, and uses these modified
probabilities to calculate the expected reference-dependent utility of the lot-
tery. The latter aspect is ignored in this paper, i.e. we will not transform
the probabilities to account for how they are perceived by the players.
Although expected utility theory remains the most important model for
rational decision-making in mainstream economic theory, the non-expected
utility theories – and prospect theory in particular – have proved to be suc-
cessful challengers of the expected utility paradigm. Many of these theories
have an equally solid mathematical basis as expected utility theory, making
them acceptable alternatives for economists. More importantly, they tend
to incorporate a number of behavioral patterns, documented in the psychol-
ogy literature2 that better explain the decisions of economic agents, and as
a consequence, are better able to provide a theoretical basis for several em-
pirically observed phenomena that do not fit with the standard theory of
rational choice3.
Although a number of these behavioral aspects have been applied to the
1For an overview of the literature on violations of expected utility theory, see for in-
stance Shoemaker (1982) or Machina (1987).
2See Kaheneman and Tversky (1979), Hershey et al. (1982), and others.
3An overview of puzzles and the solutions proposed by prospect theory is provided in
Camerer (2002).
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specific field of non-cooperative game theory4, the effects of loss aversion on
non-cooperative games have not been extensively studied. There are some
papers in which the outcomes of certain well known examples of games are
showed to be consistent with experimental or empirical observations, if the
players are assumed to be loss averse5. However, this type of literature only
focuses on specific examples, and furthermore, often starts from the common
assumption that players’ reference points are given by some exogenous sta-
tus quo value. This might not fully reflect the idea of reference-dependence
as it was originally intended: Kahneman and Tversky (1981) defined the
framing of payoffs as “the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes,
and contingencies associated with a particular choice” (p. 453). This implies
that the reference points of players playing a non-cooperative game can not
be fixed ex ante, but must be based on their own strategies (the acts), their
payoffs (the outcomes), and the strategies of their opponents (the contingen-
cies). Thus, game theory adds another dimension to the issue of framing
payoffs, and to loss aversion in general, that is often ignored.
One paper in which reference-dependence is treated consistently with
Tversky and Kahneman’s definition is Shalev (2000). There, an equilib-
rium concept is developed in which each player transforms his basic utility
payoffs with a reference point such that his expected reference-dependent
equilibrium payoff is exactly equal to that reference point. Thus, the players’
reference points can be interpreted as their expected payoffs in equilibrium.
In line with Tversky and Kahneman’s definition, they then depend on the
set of equilibrium strategies, and the players’ individual basic utility payoff
matrices.
We develop two other equilibrium concepts that take into account the
players’ loss aversion in a way that is consistent with Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s definition. Unlike Shalev, we only consider bimatrix games. The first
new concept, called ‘maximin loss aversion equilibrium’, assumes that each
player’s reference point is equal to his pure maximin value, taking into ac-
count only these pure strategies of the opponent that are played with positive
probability. This differs from Shalev’s equilibrium concept in two significant
ways: first, a player’s reference point depends on the carrier of the oppo-
nent’s strategy. In addition, it assumes that players are cautious, in the sense
4Examples are Crawford (1990), Dekel et al. (1991), and Eichberger and Kelsey (1999).
5For example, Fershtman (1996) studies an incumbency game, Berejikian (2002) a.o.
the game of chicken and the prisoner’s dilemma, and Butler (2007) an ultimatum game.
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that they base their expectations on ‘worst-case’ values. Since a player’s ref-
erence point depends on the carrier of his opponent’s strategy, it can exhibit
discontinuous jumps when the opponent’s carrier changes. Indeed, maximin
loss aversion equilibrium may fail to exist. Nonetheless, we show existence if
at least one player has at most two pure strategies.
The loss aversion safety level of a player is the value of the matrix game,
derived from the basic payoff matrix with that value as reference point. A
safety level loss aversion equilibrium is an equilibrium in the bimatrix game
obtained by transforming the basic payoffs with these loss aversion safety
levels as reference points. This type of equilibrium shares the fixed point
idea with Shalev’s loss aversion equilibrium and the cautious player property
with the maximin loss aversion equilibrium. However, it is based on reference
points that no longer depend on the opponent’s equilibrium strategy. It is
based on what he could do rather than what he will do.
We conclude the paper with a comparative statics analysis of the three
equilibrium concepts in 2 × 2 bimatrix games. Specifically, we assume that
both players are loss neutral, but that only one player has full information
regarding the loss attitudes. That is, both players know they are loss neutral
themselves, but only one of them has this information about his opponent.
We then study for each equilibrium concept what would happen to the payoff
of the fully informed player, if his partially informed opponent falsely believes
he (the fully informed player) is loss averse. Under some conditions, we find
that this situation benefits the fully informed player.
The paper continues as follows. After preliminaries in Section 2, we dis-
cuss the ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium’ from Shalev (2000) in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the maximin loss aversion equilibrium, and Section 5 the
safety level loss aversion equilibrium. In Section 6 we derive the comparative
statics results mentioned above. Finally, Section 7 contains some concluding
remarks and some directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
Before introducing the different equilibrium concepts we first define bimatrix
games and Nash equilibrium, and indicate how loss aversion of the players
can be accounted for.
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2.1 Bimatrix Games and Nash Equilibria
Players 1 and 2 have sets of pure strategies I = {1, . . . , m} and J =
{1, . . . , n}, respectively. If player 1 plays i and player 2 plays j, then player 1
(2) receives aij (bij), the number in the payoff matrix A (B) that corresponds
with the j-th element of the i-th row.
Let ek be a vector filled with zeros that has a one in position k. Let
e = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Then the (k− 1)-dimensional unit simplex ∆k is defined as
∆k := {ω ∈ Rk : eTω = 1 and ωi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k}
6.
Players’ mixed strategies are defined as probability distributions over their
sets of pure strategies, and can thus be represented by elements of a unit
simplex in the appropriately sized Euclidean space. The carrier of a player’s
strategy is the set of pure strategies that a player plays with a strictly positive
probability. That is,
Car(p) := {i ∈ I : pi > 0} and Car(q) := {j ∈ J : qj > 0}.
A Nash equilibrium in an m×n bimatrix game (A,B) is a pair (p∗, q∗), such
that p∗Aq∗ ≥ pAq∗ for all p ∈ ∆m and p∗Bq∗ ≥ p∗Bq for all q ∈ ∆n.
2.2 Loss Aversion
The way to introduce loss aversion in two-player games (A,B) is to char-
acterize the players by nonnegative loss aversion coefficients λ1 and λ2, re-
spectively measuring player 1’s and player 2’s degrees of loss aversion. Since
λ1 and λ2 are exogenous characteristics of the players, affecting the resulting
equilibrium, we henceforth include them in the definition of the bimatrix
game. Thus, a bimatrix game is an object of the form ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)).
In addition to his loss aversion coefficient, player 1 (2) has a number r1
(r2) below which he considers the basic utility payoff entries of A (B) to be
losses. These points, r1 and r2, are the players’ respective reference points.
The idea of loss aversion is captured by transforming the players’ basic utility
payoffs as follows:
aλ1,r1ij = aij − λ1max {r1 − aij , 0},
bλ2,r2ij = bij − λ2max {r2 − bij , 0}.
6We henceforth omit the superscript T , indicating transposition of the vector, as it
is always clear from the context what is meant. For the same reason we will no longer
mention the length of the vectors.
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Observe that this transformation preserves the ordering over deterministic
payoffs. That is, a decision-maker prefers basic utility payoff x to y if and
only if he prefers xλ,r to yλ,r for all λ ≥ 0 and r ∈ R.
We refer to the transformed game (Aλ1,r1, Bλ2,r2) as the loss aversion
game. For each equilibrium concept considered, we require that it is a Nash
equilibrium in the loss aversion game (Aλ1,r1 , Bλ2,r2), where the reference
points r1 and r2 are endogenous. The three equilibrium concepts differ in
the way the reference points are determined.
3 Fixed Point Loss Aversion Equilibria
In Shalev (2000), a concept of loss aversion equilibrium is introduced where
the players’ reference points are found through a fixed point calculation.
First, define
r := min
{
min
(i,j)∈ I×J
aij , min
(i,j)∈ I×J
bij
}
and
r¯ := max
{
max
(i,j)∈ I×J
aij, max
(i,j)∈ I×J
bij
}
.
In words, r and r¯ are the lowest resp. the highest payoffs in A or B. Then,
given a strategy profile (p, q) and some reference point r1 ∈ [r, r¯], player 1
has an expected payoff of pAλ1,r1q. Observe that
pAλ1,rq = pAq ≥ min
(i,j)∈ I×J
aij ≥ r
and that
r¯ ≥ max
(i,j)∈I×J
aij ≥ pAq ≥ pA
λ1,r¯q.
This and the fact that pAλ1,r1q is a continuous function of r1 implies there
is an r∗1 ∈ [r, r¯] such that r
∗
1 = pA
λ1,r
∗
1q. Furthermore, r∗1 is unique because
r1 is strictly increasing on [r, r¯], while pA
λ1,r1q is non-increasing on [r, r¯].
Similarly, there is a unique r∗2 ∈ [r, r¯] such that r
∗
2 = pB
λ2,r
∗
2q. Clearly, these
‘fixed point’ reference points can be interpreted as the utilities players expect
to realize given the strategy profile (p, q).
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Next, Shalev introduces a non-empty, compact- and convex-valued corre-
spondence β : ∆m ×∆n × [r, r]2 → ∆m ×∆n × [r, r]2 where
β(pˆ, qˆ, (rˆ1, rˆ2)) := {(p, q, (r1, r2)) ∈ ∆
m ×∆n × [r, r]2 :
r1 = pA
λ1,rˆ1 qˆ ≥ p′Aλ1,rˆ1 qˆ for all p′ ∈ ∆m, and
r2 = pˆB
λ2,rˆ2q ≥ pˆBλ2,rˆ2q′ for all q′ ∈ ∆n}.
Since the (Nash) best reply-correspondence is upper semicontinuous and the
players’ payoff functions are continuous in their respective reference points,
it follows that the correspondence β is also upper semicontinuous. Hence,
by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem there exists a fixed point (p∗, q∗, (r∗1, r
∗
2)).
Note that the strategy pair (p∗, q∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the loss aversion
game (Aλ1,r
∗
1 , Bλ2,r
∗
2 ). Since the reference points are determined through a
fixed point calculation, we refer to this equilibrium concept as a fixed point
loss aversion equilibrium.
Although this is an effective way of dealing with loss aversion, it is cer-
tainly not the only possible approach. One of the less attractive features
of this concept is that reference points are not unique: two loss aversion
equilibria generally do not yield the same expected payoffs to the players.
Furthermore, a player’s reference point depends heavily on his own beliefs
about the opponent’s strategy. In what follows, we discuss some alternative
equilibrium concepts that, if nothing else, at least broaden our view on the
issues with endogenous reference point determination.
4 Maximin Loss Aversion Equilibria
In maximin loss aversion equilibrium, each player chooses his reference point
in such a way that his maximin payoff w.r.t. the strategies he believes his
opponent plays with positive probability, is exactly equal to that reference
point. The Nash equilibria in the game that results from using these consis-
tent reference points are maximin loss aversion equilibria.
Maximin loss aversion equilibria are similar to fixed point loss aversion
equilibria, because in both concepts players base their reference points on
the carriers of their opponents’ strategies. In particular, in fixed point loss
aversion equilibrium they base them on the probability distribution they
believe their opponents have over the pure strategies in their carriers. In
maximin loss aversion equilibrium, they also believe there exists some prob-
ability distribution over the pure strategies in their opponents’ carriers, but
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they recognize that only one of these is eventually played. They then base
their reference points on the worst possible strategy their opponents could
play.
4.1 Definition of Maximin Loss Aversion Equilibria
Formally, player 1 and 2’s reference points, given the strategy profile (p, q) ∈
∆m ×∆n, are given by
r∗1 := max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(q)
a
λ1,r
∗
1
ij resp. r
∗
2 := max
j∈J
min
i∈Car(p)
b
λ2,r
∗
2
ij .
Given r∗1 and r
∗
2, each player has a minimal reference-dependent utility payoff
for each of his own pure strategies, given the strategies his opponent plays
with positive probability. The reference points are chosen such that for each
player the maximum in this set of minimal payoffs, i.e. the maximin payoff,
is equal to his reference point.
Observe that we could also do without the consistency argument here.
This is so because for all r1 ∈ [r , maxi∈I minj∈Car(q) aij], we have that
max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(q)
aλ1,r1ij = max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(q)
aij.
That is, for these values of r1 we have that the maximin point in the trans-
formed utility payoff matrix, given the opponent’s strategy q, is equal to
the maximin point in the basic utility payoff matrix, given the opponent’s
strategy q. Hence, using the reference point r1 = maxi∈I minj∈Carq aij to
transform the basic utilities, yields a transformed payoff matrix for which
the maximin point, given the strategy q, is exactly equal to that reference
point. A similar argument also holds for player 2. Thus, an equivalent defi-
nition of the maximin reference points is
r∗1 := max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(q)
aij resp. r
∗
2 := max
j∈J
min
i∈Car(p)
bij .
Note that a maximin point is unique for each carrier played by the opponent.
Since a player’s maximin payoff only depends on the carrier of the strategy
played by his opponent, rather than the strategy itself, reference points are
more robust against wrong beliefs a player may have about his opponent.
A maximin loss aversion equilibrium in a bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2))
is a pair of vectors (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆m × ∆n such that p∗Aλ1,r
∗
1q∗ ≥ pAλ1,r
∗
1q∗ for
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all p ∈ ∆m and p∗Bλ2,r
∗
2q∗ ≥ p∗Bλ2,r
∗
2q for all q ∈ ∆n, where r∗1 and r
∗
2 are
the maximin points in Aλ1,r
∗
1 resp. Bλ2,r
∗
2 given q∗ resp. p∗.
Since a player’s reference point only depends on the carrier of his oppo-
nent’s strategy, rather than the strategy itself, this maximin method might
provide a valid alternative for fixed point loss aversion. On the other hand,
it does not solve the problem of multiple reference points. Furthermore, be-
cause reference points no longer depend continuously on the strategies played
by the opponent, maximin loss aversion equilibria may fail to exist.
4.2 Existence of Maximin Loss Aversion Equilibria
We show by means of a counterexample that maximin loss aversion equilibria
may fail to exist. Next, we show existence if one of the players has no more
than two pure strategies.
4.2.1 An Example Showing Non-Existence
Consider the following 3× 3 bimatrix game:
A =

8 1 01 8 0
4 4 −1

 B =

−4 1 −21 −4 −2
−2 −2 −1

 .
Let player 2 be loss neutral, i.e. λ2 = 0, and assume λ1 = 1. Because of
player 2’s loss neutrality, r2 has no influence on the equilibrium. That is,
B = Bλ2,r2 for all values of r2. Observe that player 1’s best reply against
player 2 playing e1 is e1, and player 2’s best reply against this is e2. Hence, e1
can never be an equilibrium strategy for player 2. Similarly, we can exclude
e2 as one of player 2’s equilibrium strategies. This implies that player 1’s
equilibrium reference point is never equal to 8. This leaves two possibilities:
r1 = 0 or r1 = 4.
• r1 = 0: In this case, we have
Aλ1,0 =

8 1 01 8 0
4 4 −2

 .
The unique Nash equilibrium in (Aλ1,0, B) is ((.5, .5, 0), (.5, .5, 0)) im-
plying r1 = 4.
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• r1 = 4: In this case, we have
Aλ1,4 =

 8 −2 −4−2 8 −4
4 4 −6

 .
The unique Nash equilibrium in (Aλ1,4, B) is
((
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
,
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
))
, im-
plying r1 = 0.
Each of player 1’s possible reference points implies a loss aversion game in
which the carrier of player 2’s equilibrium strategy is such that another refer-
ence point should be chosen. Hence, there is no maximin loss aversion equilib-
rium. This implies that at least one of the conditions underlying Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem is violated for the ‘maximin’ best-reply correspondence.
Define the players’ respective maximin best reply correspondences β1 :
∆n → ∆m and β2 : ∆
m → ∆n as
β1(qˆ) := {p ∈ ∆
m : pAλ1,r1 qˆ ≥ p′Aλ1,r1 qˆ for all p′ ∈ ∆m and
r1 = max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(qˆ)
aij},
and
β2(pˆ) := {q ∈ ∆
n : pˆBλ2,r2q ≥ pˆBλ2,r2q′ for all q′ ∈ ∆n and
r2 = max
j∈J
min
i∈Car(pˆ)
bij}.
Then define the overall maximin best-reply correspondence β : ∆m ×∆n →
∆m × ∆n as β := β1 × β2. Note that for all (pˆ, qˆ) there is a single pair of
payoff matrices (Aλ1,r1 , Bλ2,r2), and the set of best replies against (pˆ, qˆ) given
these payoff matrices is non-empty, compact and convex. It follows that β is
non-empty, and compact- and convex-valued. The fact that a maximin loss
aversion equilibrium need not exist then implies that upper semicontinuity
of β is violated. More specifically, there are sequences (pk, qk) and (pˆk, qˆk) in
∆m×∆n converging to (p∗, q∗) resp. (pˆ∗, qˆ∗) and satisfying (pk, qk) ∈ β(pˆk, qˆk)
for all k ∈ N that do not satisfy (p∗, q∗) ∈ β(pˆ∗, qˆ∗).
In our example, suppose player 2 has a sequence of strategies given by
qˆk =


1
3
+ 1
6
(
1− 1
k
)
1
3
+ 1
6
(
1− 1
k
)
1
3
− 1
3
(
1− 1
k
)

 .
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Note that this implies rk1 = 0 for all k ∈ N. Then player 1 obtains
9
2
− 3
2k
from his first two strategies, and 4 − 2
k
from his second. Thus, β1(qˆ
k) =
{(α, 1 − α, 0) with α ∈ [0, 1]} for all k ∈ N. The sequence qˆk converges
to qˆ∗ = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0). Then r∗1 = 4 from which it follows that player 1 obtains
a payoff of 3 for the first two strategies and 4 for the third one. Hence,
β1(qˆ
∗) = {(0, 0, 1)}. Since β1 does not satisfy upper semicontinuity, neither
does β.
4.2.2 Existence in m× 2 and 2× n Games
Although maximin loss aversion equilibria do not exist in general, we do have
existence in the case where one of the players has no more than two pure
strategies. In the more restrictive setting of 2 × 2 bimatrix games, we can
simply apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem because the maximin best-reply
correspondence β is upper semicontinuous. To see this, let ((A,B), (λ1, λ2))
be a 2 × 2 bimatrix game, and let qˆk be a sequence in ∆2 converging to qˆ∗,
with qˆk2 > 0 for all k ∈ N, while qˆ
∗
2 = 0. Furthermore, let p
k be a sequence in
∆2, converging to p∗, such that pk ∈ β1(qˆ
k) for all k ∈ N. To show that β1 is
upper semicontinuous, it is then sufficient to show that p∗ ∈ β1(qˆ
∗).
The fact that pk ∈ β1(qˆ
k) for all k, implies that pkAλ1,r
k
1 qˆk ≥ p′Aλ1,r
k
1 qˆk
for all p′ ∈ ∆2 and k ∈ N, where
rk1 := max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(qˆk)
aij .
Let H := Car(qˆk) for some k ∈ N. Then p∗Aλ1,r1 qˆ∗ ≥ p′Aλ1,r1 qˆ∗ for all
p′ ∈ ∆2, where
r1 := max
i∈I
min
j∈H
aij .
Observe that player 2 now plays the first column with certainty. That is, qˆ∗2 =
0. Since transforming a player’s payoffs to incorporate his attitude towards
losses, leaves his preference ordering over pure alternatives unchanged, this
implies that player 1’s best reply against qˆ∗, regardless of his reference point,
is to play a strategy that yields him the highest payoff in the first column.
That is,
p∗ ∈ argmax
p∈∆2
pAλ1,ρqˆ∗ = argmax
p∈∆2
pAqˆ∗
for all ρ ∈ [r, r¯]. Hence, p∗Aλ1,r
∗
1 qˆ∗ ≥ p′Aλ1,r
∗
1 qˆ∗ for all p′ ∈ ∆2 where
r∗1 := max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(qˆ∗)
a
λ1,r
∗
1
ij .
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Hence, p∗ ∈ β1(qˆ
∗), implying that player 1’s maximin best-reply correspon-
dence β1 is upper semicontinuous. Using a similar argument we can show
that the same holds for β2. It follows that the joint maximin best-reply cor-
respondence β also satisfies upper semicontinuity, and thus - by Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem - that maximin loss aversion equilibria exist in 2 × 2
bimatrix games.
In a more general m× 2 (or 2×n) setting, the maximin best-reply corre-
spondence no longer satisfies upper semicontinuity. To see this, consider the
following example:
B =

 1 4−5 5
−2 −4

 .
Furthermore, let
pˆk =


1
3
+ 1
6
(1− 1
2k
)
1
3
− 1
3
(1− 1
2k
)
1
3
+ 1
6
(1− 1
2k
)

 ,
and assume λ2 >
1
2
. Since Car(pˆk) = {1, 2, 3}, the reference point of player
2 is rk2 = −4. Hence, the transformed payoff matrix is
Bλ2,r
k
2 =

 1 4−(5 + λ2) 5
−2 −4

 .
Given pˆk, player 2 obtains −1
2
− 9+2λ2
12k
from playing column 1, and 5
6k
from
playing column 2, which implies β2(pˆ
k) = {(0, 1)} for all k ∈ N. As k
converges to infinity, pˆk converges to pˆ∗ = (.5, 0, .5). Then player 2’s reference
point changes to r∗2 = −2. The associated loss aversion payoff matrix is
Bλ2,r
∗
2 =

 1 4−(5 + 3λ2) 5
−2 −(4 + 2λ2)

 .
Given p∗, player 2 obtains a payoff of −1
2
from playing the first column,
and −λ2 from the second. The initial assumption λ2 >
1
2
implies β2(pˆ
∗) =
{(1, 0)}. It follows that player 2’s maximin best-reply correspondence is
not upper semicontinuous. Consequently, existence of maximin loss aversion
equilibria in m × 2 (or 2 × n) games can no longer be proven by means
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of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem as in the more restrictive 2 × 2 setting.
However, we can still prove existence.
Proposition 4.1 For all λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 and m×2 matrices A and B, there exists
a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in the game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)). Similarly,
for all λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 and 2 × n matrices A and B, there exists a maximin loss
aversion equilibrium in the game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)).
Proof. Let A,B bem×2 matrices, and consider the game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)).
Define
r˜ := max
i∈I
min
j∈J
aij ,
and let (p∗, q) be a Nash equilibrium in the game (Aλ1,r˜, B). We can distin-
guish three (exhaustive) cases:
i. q = et where t ∈ J , i.e. player 2’s equilibrium strategy is pure. This
implies there is an s ∈ Car(pˆ∗) such that bst = maxj∈J bsj , because
otherwise strategy t would be strictly dominated by the other strategy
in J . Since loss aversion preserves the agent’s preference ordering over
pure alternatives, this implies bλ2,bstst = maxj∈J b
λ2,bst
sj . From the fact
that s ∈ Car(pˆ∗), it follows that aλ1,r˜st = maxi∈I a
λ1,r˜
it , and thus also
aλ1,astst = maxi∈I a
λ1,ast
it . Hence, (e
s, et) is a pure loss aversion equilibrium
in ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)).
ii. (p∗, q) = (es, (β, 1− β)) where s ∈ I and β ∈ (0, 1). This implies
βaλ1,r1s1 + (1− β)a
λ1,r1
s2 ≥ βa
λ1,r1
i1 + (1− β)a
λ1,r1
i2
for all i ∈ I with r1 = r˜. Furthermore, it implies bs1 = bs2 =: b from
which it follows that bλ2,r2s1 = b
λ2,r2
s2 with r2 = b. Hence, (e
s, (β, 1− β)) is
a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)).
iii. p∗ and q satisfy |Car(p∗)| ≥ 2 and |Car(q)| = 2. Then there must exist
pure strategies s and s′ in Car(p∗) such that
• either bs1 > bs2 and bs′1 < bs′2,
• or bs1 < bs2 and bs′1 > bs′2,
• or bs1 = bs2 and bs′1 = bs′2.
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In all three cases, there exists an α ∈ (0, 1) such that both player 2’s
pure strategies are best replies against player 1’s strategy (αes + (1 −
α)es
′
), with payoffs given by Bλ2,r2 where r2 = maxj∈J mini∈{s,s′} bij . But
then ((α, 1 − α), q) is a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in the game
((A,B), (λ1, λ2)).
Since all types of Nash equilibria in (Aλ1,r˜1, B) lead to a maximin loss aversion
equilibrium, this establishes existence in m × 2 bimatrix games. The proof
of existence in 2× n bimatrix games is analogous to the m× 2 case.
Note that this proposition also provides a method to calculate maximin
loss aversion equilibria. One can modify player 1’s payoff matrix under the
assumption that player 2 plays both his strategies with a positive probability,
and calculate the Nash equilibria in the resulting game. These Nash equilibria
can then be transformed into maximin loss aversion equilibria.
5 Safety Level Loss Aversion Equilibria
Here, we introduce the safety level loss aversion equilibrium. Each player
takes as a reference point his safety level, i.e. the maximum payoff he would
receive if his opponent’s only objective were to minimize this expected pay-
off. This is similar to maximin loss aversion equilibria, but less pessimistic
in the sense that players’ safety levels are at least as high as their maximin
points, given the opponents’ carriers. On the other hand, one could argue
that the safety level loss aversion equilibrium is more pessimistic than the
maximin loss aversion equilibrium, because it is independent of the oppo-
nent’s strategy in equilibrium, and thus does not exclude the opponent’s
pure non-equilibrium strategies. Aside from the discussion which concept
is more optimistic, the safety level loss aversion equilibrium has some obvi-
ous advantages: it not only solves the existence problem, it also provides an
answer to the question of multiple reference points.
5.1 Strict Dominance when Players are Loss Averse
A strategy is strictly dominated if there is another strategy that yields a
higher payoff for every strategy of the opponent. Thus, a strictly dominated
strategy is never in the carrier of a player’s equilibrium strategy. Since in the
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previous equilibrium concepts, each reference point depended on the oppo-
nent’s equilibrium strategy, it follows that strictly dominated strategies did
not influence the players’ equilibrium reference points. Thus, strict domi-
nance did not play a role so far.
In the safety level loss aversion equilibrium concept, however, strictly
dominated strategies could play a role. That is, if a player has a strictly
dominated strategy, then his opponent could also determine his reference
point using the reduced payoff matrix, i.e. the payoff matrix from which
the strictly dominated strategy was removed. Elimination of such strategies
generally leads to different reference points, and consequently also to different
equilibria. To account for the fact that players may be loss averse, we have
to extend the standard definition of strict dominance.
Formally, we say that a pure strategy i ∈ I is a strictly dominated strategy
in A if there is a strategy p ∈ ∆m with pi = 0, such that pAe
j > eiAej for
all j ∈ J . A pure strategy i ∈ I is said to be strictly dominated in (A, λ1),
if it is strictly dominated in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, r¯]. Then, to eliminate a
pure strategy i ∈ I from the game, it is no longer sufficient that it is strictly
dominated in A. To see this, consider the following example:
A =

5 00 5
2 2

 .
Observe that player 1’s pure strategy e3 is strictly dominated by the mixed
strategy (0.5, 0.5, 0). Now let λ1 = 1 and r1 = 2. Then the transformed
payoff matrix is
A1,2 =

 5 −2−2 5
2 2

 .
The conditions for e3 to be strictly dominated by some p = (p1, p2, 0) are
5p1 − 2p2 > 2, and
−2p1 + 5p2 > 2,
which together imply 3 > 4. Thus, e3 is no longer strictly dominated in A1,2,
even though it was in A. Since A = Aλ1,r, i being strictly dominated in A
is still a necessary condition for i to be strictly dominated in (A, λ1). The
following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition.
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Proposition 5.1 In the game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)) where λ1 > 0, a strategy
p ∈ ∆m strictly dominates the pure strategy i ∈ I in (A, λ1) if and only if p
strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all
ρ ∈
[
min
j∈J
aij , max
(i′,j)∈Car(p)×J
ai′j
]
.
Proof. Let a pure strategy i be strictly dominated by a strategy p in the
payoff matrix A. Then define ρ := minj∈J aij and ρ¯ := max(i′,j)∈Car(p)×J ai′j .
⇐: Let the pure strategy i be strictly dominated in (A, λ1). Then it is
strictly dominated in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, r¯]. Since [ρ, ρ¯] ⊆ [r, r¯], strategy i is
strictly dominated in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ¯].
⇒: Let the pure strategy i be strictly dominated by p in Aλ1,ρ for all
ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ¯]. Then p strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ. That is,
pAλ1,ρej > eiAλ1,ρej
for all j ∈ J . Let ρ ∈ [r, ρ]. Then eiAλ1,ρej = eiAλ1,ρej. Furthermore,
pAλ1,ρej ≤ pAλ1,ρej since ρ ≥ ρ. Hence, pAλ1,ρej > eiAλ1,ρej as well. So p
strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, ρ].
Similarly, p strictly dominating i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ¯] implies that p
strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ¯. That is, pAλ1,ρ¯ej > eiAλ1,ρ¯ej for all j ∈ J .
Observe that for all ρ ∈ [ρ¯, r¯], we have that
pAλ1,ρej = (1 + λ1)pAe
j − λ1ρ.
Note that for all j ∈ J there is an i′ ∈ Car(p) such that eiAλ1,ρej ≤ ei
′
Aλ1,ρej .
Hence, for all j ∈ J we have that eiAλ1,ρej ≤ ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ¯, r¯], implying
eiAλ1,ρej = (1 + λ1)e
iAej − λ1ρ
for all j ∈ J and ρ ∈ [ρ¯, r¯]. Hence, (1 + λ1)pAe
j − λ1ρ¯ > (1 + λ1)e
iAej − λ1ρ¯
for all j ∈ J , and the inequality is preserved if we replace ρ¯ by any ρ ∈ [ρ¯, r¯].
But then pAλ1,ρej > eiAλ1,ρej for all j ∈ J and ρ ∈ [ρ¯, r¯]. That is, p strictly
dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ¯, r¯].
In conclusion, p strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, r¯], which means
that p strictly dominates i in (A, λ1).
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Remark 5.2 It could happen that none of the l strategies p1, . . . , pl ∈ ∆
m
dominate a pure strategy i in (A, λ1), while taken together they do. Suppose
none of the strategies p1, . . . , pl dominates i in (A, λ1). Then there are in-
tervals R1, . . . , Rl ⊆ [r, r¯] such that for all k = 1, . . . , l we have pkA
λ1,ρej ≤
eiAλ1,ρej for all ρ ∈ Rk and some j ∈ J . Then, as long as
⋂l
k=1Rk = ∅, there
is always a strategy pk strictly better than pure strategy i.
In the following section, when we are talking about a bimatrix game
((A,B), (λ1, λ2)), we could assume that the payoff matrices A and B are the
result of iterated elimination of strategies that are either strictly dominated
in (A, λ1) and (B, λ2) respectively, or strictly dominated in the weaker sense,
explained in the above remark.
5.2 Definition and Existence of Safety Level Loss Aver-
sion Equilibria
The safety level is a concept that dates back to Janos von Neumann’s analy-
sis of zero-sum games in von Neumann (1928). Suppose that for each of his
strategies, player i assumes that player j plays that (possibly mixed) strat-
egy that minimizes i’s expected payoff. Then player i can play that (possibly
mixed) strategy that yields him the highest such minimal payoff. Von Neu-
mann showed that when player j adopts the above strategy, then player i
obtains the exact same payoff. This payoff is referred to as his safety level.
Formally, given a regular bimatrix game with loss neutral players (A,B),
the players’ safety levels, denoted by v1(A) resp. v2(B), are defined by
v1(A) := max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAq, and v2(B) := max
q∈∆n
min
p∈∆m
pBq.
Since a player can guarantee his safety level, it would make an intuitively
appealing reference point in a bimatrix game where players are loss averse,
i.e. ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)). However, if a player’s basic utility payoff matrix has
no saddle points, then this implies there is a strictly positive probability that
he obtains a payoff lower than his safety level, and thus incurs a loss. Hence,
we again require a consistency argument in the sense that a player’s payoff
matrix should be transformed using a reference point, such that his resulting
safety level is equal to that reference point. That is, we are looking for an r∗1
and r∗2 such that r
∗
1 := v1(A
λ1,r
∗
1 ) and r∗2 := v2(B
λ2,r
∗
2 ). Such reference points
are called loss aversion safety levels.
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Consider the bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)). To show that there is a
unique r∗1 such that r
∗
1 := v1(A
λ1,r
∗
1 ), it is sufficient to show that v1(A
λ1,r1) is
a continuous, non-increasing function of r1 on the interval [r, r¯], and that
v1(A
λ1,r) ≥ r, and v1(A
λ1,r¯) ≤ r¯.
It is obvious that v1(A
λ1,r1) is continuous in r1. To show that it is non-
increasing in r1 on the interval [r, r¯], let r1 and s1 be some reference points
in [r, r¯] with r1 > s1, and let
p∗ ∈ arg max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAλ1,r1q, and
q∗ ∈ arg min
q∈∆n
p∗Aλ1,s1q.
We then have
v1(A
λ1,s1) = max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAλ1,s1q
≥ min
q∈∆n
p∗Aλ1,s1q
= p∗Aλ1,s1q∗.
Note that pAλ1,r1q is non-increasing in r1 for any given strategy pair (p, q).
Therefore, p∗Aλ1,s1q∗ ≥ p∗Aλ1,r1q∗. Now observe that
p∗Aλ1,r1q∗ ≥ min
q∈∆n
p∗Aλ1,r1q
= max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAλ1,r1q
= v1(A
λ1,r1).
It follows that a player’s unique safety level is a non-increasing continuous
function of his reference point. Furthermore,
v1(A
λ1,r) = v1(A) ≥ min
(i,j)∈I×J
aij ≥ r,
and since v1(A
λ1,r1) is non-increasing in r1, we also have
v1(A
λ1,r¯) ≤ v1(A
λ1,r) = v1(A) ≤ max
(i,j)∈I×J
aij ≤ r¯.
Thus, there must be a unique r∗1 ∈ [r, r¯] such that r
∗
1 = v1(A
λ1,r
∗
1 ). Similarly,
if player 2 is loss averse, then there exists a unique r∗2 ∈ [r, r¯] such that
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r∗2 = v2(B
λ2,r
∗
2). In conclusion, given ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)), each player has a
unique loss aversion safety level.
The players transform their payoff matrices using their degrees of loss
aversion and their loss aversion safety levels. The safety level loss aver-
sion equilibria are the Nash equilibria in the transformed game. Formally,
a safety level loss aversion equilibrium is a strategy pair (p∗, q∗), such that
p∗Aλ1,r
∗
1q∗ ≥ pAλ1,r
∗
1q∗ for all p ∈ ∆m, and p∗Bλ2,r
∗
2q∗ ≥ p∗Bλ2,r
∗
2q for all
q ∈ ∆n, where r∗1 := v1(A
λ1,r
∗
1) and r∗2 := v2(B
λ2,r
∗
2 ).
Existence of a unique loss aversion safety level and the existence of Nash
equilibria together imply general existence of safety level loss aversion equi-
libria. Here, in contrast with the previous equilibrium concepts, the players’
reference points no longer depend on the strategies they believe their oppo-
nents will play in equilibrium, but rather on the strategies their opponents
would play in a worst-case scenario.
6 Comparative Statics
In this section we consider the effect loss aversion has on the equilibrium
payoff of a player in 2× 2 bimatrix games. More specifically, we investigate
how a player’s expected payoff changes when he claims to be loss averse,
when in reality, he is neutral against losses, given that the opponent is also
loss neutral. The latter assumption implies that we compare the loss aversion
equilibrium payoff of a loss neutral player who claims to be loss averse to his
standard Nash equilibrium payoff. First, we impose some conditions on the
payoffs to make sure there is a mixed Nash equilibrium. Then we obtain
sufficient conditions for a player to benefit from his opponent believing he
is loss averse, when in fact he is not. Finally, we check for each equilibrium
concept whether these sufficient conditions hold.
6.1 Preliminaries
To circumvent the existence problem for maximin equilibria we only consider
2 × 2 bimatrix games. The basic utilities are represented by the following
matrices:
A :=
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
and B :=
[
b11 b12
b21 b22
]
.
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Since pure Nash equilibria are equivalent to the pure versions of all three
types of loss aversion equilibrium considered above, we can restrict ourselves
to mixed equilibria. Following Berden and Peters (2006), we exclude the
case where player 1 has a weakly dominant strategy, implying a11 6= a21 and
a12 6= a22. W.l.o.g. assume a11 > a21, a12 < a22, and a11 ≥ a22. This leaves
three exhaustive cases:
i. a21 ≥ a22;
ii. a22 ≥ a21 ≥ a12;
iii. a12 ≥ a21.
In addition, assume b11 < b12 and b21 > b22. Hence, player 2 has no weakly
dominant strategy.
Let (p∗, q∗) be a Nash equilibrium in this game. The conditions on the
players’ payoffs imply that (p∗, q∗) is a completely mixed, unique Nash equi-
librium. Then
p∗ =
[
γ
1− γ
]
and q∗ =
[
δ
1− δ
]
,
where
γ =
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
and δ =
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
.
Assume that player 2 does not have any information about his opponent’s
attitude towards losses, allowing him to form a wrong belief about it. That
is, he may believe player 1 is loss averse, even if he is not. This would also
affect player 2’s belief about the utility function of the first player, so in order
to make him (player 1) indifferent between his two pure strategies, he has
to mix differently between his own pure strategies. Specifically, he plays a
strategy q˜ = (δ˜, 1− δ˜) where δ˜ ∈ (0, 1). Player 1 knows the utility function
of his opponent, so he keeps playing his previous strategy p∗. Thus, if player
2 misperceives λ1, the mixed loss aversion equilibrium becomes (p
∗, q˜). 7
The equilibrium under player 2’s misperception of λ1 can be explained in
two ways. First, player 1 could be naive in the sense that he does not know
7If player 1’s changed degree of loss aversion would change the carrier of his opponent,
then it would also change his equilibrium strategy. However, since we are in a 2 × 2
framework, players keep playing strategies with full carriers for each type of loss aversion
equilibrium.
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that player 2 does not perceive his degree of loss aversion correctly. Thus,
player 1 plays his equilibrium strategy and is surprised by player 2’s action.
A second explanation would be that player 1 – knowing that player 2 does
not have any information about λ1 – intentionally misrepresents his degree
of loss aversion, but is myopic in the sense that he is not able to determine
the strategy he has to play in order to optimally exploit player 2’s action.
Note that the assumption that player 1 is naive or myopic in the sense
described above, also allows for a more general situation where both players
are loss averse ex ante, but where player 2 overestimates player 1’s degree
of loss aversion. However, to avoid cluttered notation, we henceforth stick
to the simpler but analogous situation of loss neutral players where player 2
erroneously believes that player 1 is loss averse.
6.2 Main Result
Above, we defined the game and explained what it means that an opponent
has a wrong belief about a player’s degree of loss aversion. Here, we aim
to investigate how an opponent’s wrong belief might influence a player’s
expected payoff. We say that player 2’s misperception of λ1 benefits player
1 if p∗Aq˜ ≥ p∗Aq∗, and hurts him if p∗Aq˜ ≤ p∗Aq∗.8 The following theorem
presents the comparative statics result.
Theorem 6.1 In case i. player 1 benefits from player 2 misperceiving λ1.
In cases ii. and iii. player 1 benefits from player 2 misperceiving λ1 if and
only if
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 − b22
≥
a22 − a21
a11 − a12 − a21 − a22
. (1)
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Condition (1) can be interpreted as follows. Define p′ := (γ′, 1− γ′) with
γ′ :=
a22 − a21
a11 − a21 − a12 + a22
,
and observe that this is exactly the strategy player 1 must play to be in-
different between the actions of his opponent9. Furthermore, this strategy
8Note that player 2’s wrong belief about his opponent’s loss attitude hurts nor benefits
him. That is, p∗Bq∗ = p∗Bq˜.
9Note that p′ may not exist, i.e. player 1 can only play p′ if 0 ≤ γ′ ≤ 1.
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yields the Nash equilibrium payoff (a11a22 − a12a21)/(a11 − a21 − a12 + a22),
regardless of the strategy of player 2. Thus, as long as player 2 plays his
Nash equilibrium strategy q∗, then player 1 is indifferent between playing
p∗ and p′. However, if player 2 plays q˜, i.e. erroneously believes player 1 is
loss averse, then player 1 gets the Nash equilibrium payoff by playing p′, but
could get something more or something less by playing p∗.
Given this simple condition on the payoffs of the players, we thus obtain
that pretending to be more loss averse makes a player better off. The com-
parative statics of the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium were investigated
before in (Shalev, 2000) with different results. This can be explained as fol-
lows. Shalev investigated how a player’s reference point moves with his own
degree of loss aversion. As this reference point equals this player’s equilib-
rium payoff by definition, this would then yield comparative statics results.
However, when a player’s degree of loss aversion is changed, also his utility
function is changed. Thus, expected utility payoffs are compared, which have
been obtained with different utility functions. We investigate how player i’s
payoff changes when the belief player j has about i’s degree of loss aversion
changes. Since player i’s utility function is independent of player j’s beliefs
about λi, this approach circumvents the pitfall of changing utility functions.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this article we have argued that in order to correctly incorporate the
concept of loss aversion into non-cooperative game theory, it is necessary to
let the reference points of the players depend on the strategies their opponents
play. We have examined three different loss aversion equilibrium concepts
that satisfied this requirement. Then we established that in 2 × 2 bimatrix
games, a simple condition on the payoffs is sufficient for a player to benefit
from his opponent overestimating his (the player’s) degree of loss aversion.
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A Proofs for Section 6
It is obvious that a player’s reference point is in between the lowest and
the highest payoff in his payoff matrix. To simplify the comparative statics
analysis of loss aversion equilibria, it is useful to further narrow down this
interval for each equilibrium type. In the restrictive 2 × 2 case, there are
three intervals which could contain r1: the upper, the middle and the lower
interval. Let pi ∈ R4 with
pi =


(a12 , a22 , a21 , a11) in case i.
(a12 , a21 , a22 , a11) in case ii.
(a21 , a12 , a22 , a11) in case iii.
The following lemma says that the reference point in fixed point loss aversion
equilibrium, lies in the middle interval.
Lemma A.1 If (p∗, q∗, (r1, r2)) is a fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in
((A,B), (λ1, λ2), then r1 ∈ [pi2, pi3).
Proof. Let xˆ denote the basic utility payoff x that has been transformed
to account for the fact that the decision maker considers it to be a loss.
Suppose r1 ≥ max{a21, a22}. The expected payoff under the mixed loss
aversion equilibrium is equal to a linear combination of aˆ21 and aˆ22. Since
such a linear combination is strictly smaller than max{aˆ21, aˆ22}, which in
turn is smaller than max{a21, a22}, this contradicts the assumption r1 ≥
max{a21, a22}. Thus, r1 < pi3.
To see that the reference point can never be in the lower interval, we must
look at each case separately.
Case i.: Here, a21 ≥ a22 and a22 > a12. Assume r1 ∈ [a12, a22). The trans-
formed payoff a12 is denoted by aˆ12. Note that a22 − a21 ≤ 0 and
aˆ12 − a22 < 0, and thus (a22 − a21)(aˆ12 − a22) ≥ 0. Working out
the lefthand side of the inequality and writing the righthand side as
a11a22 − a11a22 yields
a22aˆ12 − a
2
22 − a21aˆ12 + a21a22 ≥ a11a22 − a11a22,
from which it follows that
a11a22 − a21aˆ12 ≥ a11a22 − a22aˆ12 − a21a22 + a
2
22.
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Getting a22 out of the expression on the righthand side of the inequality
yields a22(a11 − aˆ12 − a21 + a22). The starting assumption of the three
cases was that a11 − a21 > 0 and a22 − aˆ12 > 0, implying a11 − aˆ12 −
a21 + a22 > 0. It follows that
a11a22 − a21aˆ12
a11 − aˆ12 − a21 + a22
≥ a22.
In other words, player 1’s expected payoff under loss aversion is larger
or equal than a22, contradicting r1 < a22. Thus, r1 ≥ pi2.
Case ii.: Here, a11 > a21 and a22 ≥ a21, implying (a11 − a21)(a22 − a21) ≥ 0.
Assume r1 ∈ [a12, a21), and again, let aˆ12 represent the transformed a12.
Working out the lefthand side of the above inequality, and writing the
righthand side as a21aˆ12 − a21aˆ12 yields
a11a22 − a21a22 − a11a21 + a
2
21 ≥ a21aˆ12 − a21aˆ12.
Rearranging the terms then yields
a11a22 − a21aˆ12 ≥ a11a21 − a21aˆ12 − a
2
21 + a21a22.
Getting a21 out of the expression on the righthand side results in
a21(a11 − aˆ12 − a21 + a22). Since a11 − aˆ12 − a21 + a22 > 0, we have
a11a22 − a21aˆ12
a11 − aˆ12 − a21 + a22
≥ a21,
contradicting r1 < a21. Hence, r1 ≥ pi2.
Case iii.: Repeating the argument from case ii., with a21 replaced by a12, and
aˆ12 by aˆ21, yields the desired contradiction for case iii.
It follows from the above that r1 ∈ [pi2, pi3).
For the other loss aversion equilibrium concepts, we have a similar result.
Lemma A.2 If (p∗, q∗, (r1, r2)) is a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in
((A,B), (λ1, λ2), then r1 = pi2.
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Proof. Since we have a unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium, both
players play full carriers. Then
Case i.: maxi∈I minj∈J aij = max{a12, a22} = a22.
Case ii. and iii.: maxi∈I minj∈J aij = max{a12, a21} = a21.
Thus, r1 = pi2.
Lemma A.3 If (p∗, q∗, (r1, r2)) is a safety level loss aversion equilibrium in
((A,B), (λ1, λ2)), then r1 ∈ [pi2, pi3].
Proof. Recall that for any 2× 2 matrix A, we have
v1(A) = max
p∈∆2
min
q∈∆2
pAq ≥ max
i∈I
min
q∈∆2
eiAq = max
i∈I
min
j∈J
eiAej .
Assume r1 < pi2. Then
pi2 = max
i∈I
min
j∈J
eiAλ1,r1ej .
In safety level loss aversion equilibrium we have r1 = v1(A
λ1,r1). Then
v1(A
λ1,r1) < pi2 = max
i∈I
min
j∈J
eiAλ1,r1ej,
which is a contradiction. Hence, r1 ≥ pi2.
The safety level, v1(A
λ1,r1), can be interpreted as player 1’s Nash equilib-
rium payoff in the zero-sum game (Aλ1,r1,−Aλ1,r1). By a similar reasoning
as above, we have that player 2’s payoff, −v1(A
λ1,r1), is above −pi3, implying
v1(A
λ1,r1) ≤ pi3. Hence, r1 ∈ [pi2, pi3].
Recall that q˜ = (δ˜, 1− δ˜). Next δ˜ is stated for the three different cases.
Case i.: Here, we have a11 > a21 ≥ a22 > a12, and by the lemma’s A.1 –
A.3, r1 ∈ [a22, a21]. Thus,
δ˜ =
a22 − a12 − λ1(r1 − a22) + λ1(r1 − a12)
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 + λ1(r1 − a12)− λ1(r1 − a22)
=
(1 + λ1)(a22 − a12)
a11 − a21 + (1 + λ1)(a22 − a12)
.
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Case ii.: Here a11 > a22 ≥ a21 > a12 with a11 > a22, a22 > a21, or both. By
the above lemma’s, we have r1 ∈ [a21, a22]. Hence,
δ˜ =
a22 − a12 + λ1(r1 − a12)
a11 − a12 + λ1(r1 − a12)− a21 + λ1(r1 − a21) + a22
=
a22 − a12 + λ1(r1 − a12)
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 + λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21)
.
Case iii.: Here a11 > a22 ≥ a12 > a21. We thus have r1 ∈ [a12, a22], which
implies that δ˜ doen’t change compared to case ii. That is,
δ˜ =
a22 − a12 + λ1(r1 − a12)
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 + λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21)
.
Having specified q˜, player 2’s equilibrium strategy given a wrong belief
about λ1, for each case, we can now ask the question how it compares to q
∗,
player 2’s equilibrium strategy given the correct belief about λ1.
Lemma A.4 Given the bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1, λ2)), let (p
∗, (δ, 1−δ)) be
the unique Nash equilibrium in (A,B), and (p∗, (δ˜, 1−δ˜)) the Nash equilibrium
in (Aλ1,r1, B), where r1 is the equilibrium reference point associated with some
loss aversion equilibrium type. Then
δ˜ ≥ δ
in all three cases.
Proof. Let x := a22− a12 and y := a11− a21− a12+ a22. Note that x and y
are strictly positive, and that δ = x/y. Assume λ1 > 0. Again, consider the
different cases.
Case i.: Here we have
δ˜ =
(1 + λ1)(a22 − a12)
a11 − a21 + (1 + λ1)(a22 − a12)
=
(1 + λ1)x
y + λ1x
.
The fact that a11 > a21 implies y > x. Since λ1x > 0, this implies
λ1xy > λ1x
2. Observe that xy > 0 and y(y + λ1x) > 0. Hence,
xy + λ1xy
y(y + λ1x)
>
xy + λ1x
2
y(y + λ1x)
.
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Canceling out y in the lefthand side and y+ λ1x on the righthand side
then yields
(1 + λ1)x
y + λ1x
>
x
y
,
which is equivalent to δ˜ > δ.
Case ii. and iii.: Here we have
δ˜ =
a22 − a12 + λ1(r1 − a12)
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 + λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21)
=
x+ λ1(r1 − a12)
y + λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21)
.
Consider the linear function f : [a21, a22]→ R, given by
f(r1) :=
[
a21
a11 − a21
−
a12
a22 − a12
]
+
[
1
a22 − a12
−
1
a11 − a21
]
r1.
Observe that f(a21) ≥ 0 and f(a22) ≥ 0. Since f is a linear function,
this implies f(r1) ≥ 0 for all r1 ∈ [a21, a22]. This implies
r1 − a12
x
≥
r1 − a21
y − x
,
which is equivalent to (r1 − a12)(y − x) ≥ (r1 − a21)x since both x
and y − x are strictly positive. Since λ1 > 0, this can be rewritten to
λ1(r1 − a12)y ≥ λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21)x. Adding the constant term xy on
both sides yields xy + λ1(r1 − a12)y ≥ xy + λ1(2r1− a12 − a21)x. Since
y > 0 and y + λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21) > 0, it follows that
x+ λ1(r1 − a12)
y + λ1(2r1 − a12 − a21)
≥
x
y
.
Hence, δ˜ ≥ δ.
Thus, δ˜ ≥ δ in general.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: We have
p∗Aq∗ =
[
γa11 + (1− γ)a21 γa12 + (1− γ)a22
] [ δ
1− δ
]
,
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and
p∗Aq˜ =
[
γa11 + (1− γ)a21 γa12 + (1− γ)a22
] [ δ˜
1− δ˜
]
.
From Lemma A.4, we have δ˜ ≥ δ. Then p∗Aq˜ ≥ p∗Aq∗ if and only if γa11 +
(1− γ)a21 ≥ γa12 + (1− γ)a22, which is equivalent to
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 − b22
≥
a22 − a21
a11 − a12 − a21 − a22
.
Observe that in case i. this condition is trivially satisfied. This concludes
the proof.
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